It is often said of football that it was invented by the English and perfected by the Brazilians, and while the Scottish could challenge that view in terms of its invention, the humble Hungarians could also shout “what about us?” with regard to its perfection. In the modern day, when a sublime display of attacking football is witnessed, one might say “It’s just like watching Brazil”. Instead, it could very easily have been “It’s just like watching Hungary”, as odd as that would sound nowadays.
In the early 1950s, despite the first four World Cup tournaments being dominated by Uruguayan (1930 & 1950) and Italian (1934 & 1938) success, England, by its press at least, still considered itself superior in the world game. At the time, England had never lost a match on home soil to a nation from outside of the UK & Ireland region. On Wednesday 25th November 1953, that all changed. 105,000 spectators who had gathered inside the Empire Wembley Stadium at 16:45 were not prepared for what was about to unfold, and certainly not expecting to witness what would later be labelled the ‘Match of the Century’.
Welcome to a brand new episode of emulating real life tactics where I’ve tried to replicate the tactical system by Gusztáv Sebes’ Hungary 1953 national team in Football Manager 2020. The Hungarian team best known as the Golden Team, the Mighty Magyars or the Magical Magyars, was honored as the best international football team ever in football history by BBC in 2016. Discover how I’ve replicated Gustav Sebes’ tactical system in Football Manager 2020.
The story of the Hungarian national team is one of unrelenting brilliance, but also a story of regret and sadness. As a country under communist rule, Hungary’s Deputy Sports Minister Gusztáv Sebes was tasked with creating their national team in an endeavour to further sporting excellence. The Hungarians had seen the virtue of creating fitness regimes. Most of their players played for the State-sponsored Army team Honvéd, which ensured that each member of the team was familiar with the style and strengths of each of his teammates.
Between 1950 and 1956, Hungary recorded 42 victories, 7 draws, and just one defeat, scoring 215 goals along the way. They are generally credited for successfully implementing an early form of ‘Total Football’, later used by the Dutch in the 1970s. They won gold at the 1952 Olympic Games in Finland, defeating Yugoslavia 2-0 in the final. Sebes demanded rigorous training and standards of physical fitness from his players, as well as good tactical awareness. As a consequence, the Hungarian side were able to outrun, outpass and outplay their opposition.
According to Jonathan Wilson in his marvellous book Inverting the Pyramid, Sebes had set his team out in a “system [that] was a hair’s-breadth from [a] 4-2-4” formation. The starting line-up was as follows:
- 1. Gyula Grosics (captain)
- 2. Jenő Buzánszky
- 3. Mihály Lantos
- 4. Gyula Lóránt
- 5. Jószef Bozsik
- 6. Jószef Zakariás
- 7. László Budai
- 8. Sándor Kocsis
- 9. Nándor Hidegkuti
- 10. Ferenc Puskás
- 11. Zoltán Czibor
In Inverting the Pyramid, Wilson illustrates the tactical setup as depicted in Sebes’ notebook:
It’s important to consider here that back in those days, a player’s shirt number insinuated what position they played. For example, a player wearing 9 would be considered the centre-forward, the players wearing 8 and 10 would be considered as inside-forwards, and 7 and 11 would be considered as wingers – up until then the 3-2-5 (or W-M) formation had become the commonly used system globally, which is a key reason why each number had developed a recognised role.
However, in this Hungarian team, also known as the ‘Magical Magyars’ or the ‘Might Magyars’, Hidegkuti (the 9) effectively operated as a midfielder. England were also undone by the use of Kocsis (8) and Puskás (10) as strikers – England thought they were inside-forwards. To further confuse the English players, the Hungarian forwards were continually swapping positions. Naïvely on England’s part, their defenders were marking whoever was wearing a particular number (man-marking), instead of marking the player who was in a particular area (zonal marking), although in fairness to England man-marking was the taught and understood method of defending.
Bozsik played in the deep lying midfield position, with Hidegkuti free to roam between midfield and attack. Zakariás operated so deep so that he was almost like a second central-defender. Puskás and Kocsis were the strikers, with the width provided by Czibor and Budai. Time and again Hidegkuti and Puskás drew English players out of position, allowing the more technically skilled Hungarian players to bypass their markers with ease. After England scored a penalty in the 57th minute to make it 3-6, the rest of the game was effectively an exhibition match as Hungary simply kept the ball. The final score was 3-6; Hungary had 35 shots on goal to England’s 5, and their final goal, a Hidegkuti volley, followed a 10-pass sequence. Watching from the stands that day was a 20-year-old Bobby Robson, and, reflecting on this match many years later, he recalled:
“All these fantastic players, they were men from Mars as far as we were concerned. The way they played, their technical brilliance and expertise – our WM formation was kyboshed in 90 minutes of football.”
Sebes’ most revolutionary idea was that every player should be able to play in all positions. The Hungarian tactic of players constantly changing roles and positions contributed greatly to the success of the team – however, it could only be introduced by using a core set of talented players who were used to playing together at club level for a period of time. As mentioned earlier, many of the starting XI (7, to be exact) played their club football for Honvéd, and 3 of the other players – including Hidegkuti – played for Vörös Lobogó.
Everyone in the team was encouraged to support the attack. In an interview for a documentary produced many years later, Jenő Buzánszky said:
“When we attacked, everyone attacked. The midfielders moved forward behind the attackers, and the defenders followed up behind the midfield. It was seamless. If the opposition cleared the ball, there were no empty spaces, and so we were able to quickly win the ball back, and start another attack.”
For Puskás’ first goal in their 3-6 victory at Wembley, Czibor, who had started the match on the left wing, had made a run down the right into an unoccupied space, and squared the ball low to Puskás, who dragged the ball wonderfully past the sliding defender Billy Wright, and fired in at the near post. For context, Wright was considered among the world’s finest centre-backs at the time.
The following years
Hungary went into the 1954 World Cup in Switzerland as favourites. Puskás suffered a serious ankle injury after a foul by a West German opponent in the group stage. Without him, Hungary went on to win a bad-tempered quarter-final 4-2 against Brazil. They beat reigning champions Uruguay in the semi-final after scoring twice in extra time: two crosses from Budai, two headers from Kocsis, 4-2. In the final against West Germany, Hungary raced into a 2-0 lead, but the Germans came back to 2-2. Hungary rallied, hitting the post and having a shot cleared off the line, but West Germany then grabbed a late goal for 3-2. Puskás scored a last-minute equaliser, which was incorrectly ruled out for offside. Incidentally, the second German goal was deemed illegal but was allowed to stand. It was Hungary’s only defeat in more than 4 years. The Germans called it the ‘Miracle of Berne’.
After the World Cup, the Magical Magyars went on an 18-game unbeaten run. Using the World Football Elo Ratings system, the Hungarians of the mid-1950s are the highest ranked team of all time. As if the events of the 1954 World Cup final weren’t a sad enough story, significantly greater heartbreak was to follow when this incredible Hungarian team was broken up by the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.
Formation, positions, and tactics
As mentioned earlier in quoting Wilson, Hungary’s formation was almost a 4-2-4. It could also have been interpreted as a 3-2-1-4, considering the base positions. It remains open to interpretation, however, such was the fluidity of the system – Wilson would have been all too aware of this and therefore content to settle on the illustration from Sebes’ notebook as a rule. This formation typically involved:
- A three-man defence, with supporting full-backs and a sweeper.
- A three-man midfield, with one operating almost as a defender, another getting forward from a defensive-midfield position, and the other (the 9) playing as an attacking midfielder.
- A four-man attack, with supporting wingers and strikers.
Grosics, the goalkeeper, was sometimes referred to as the ‘fourth back’, as he was encouraged by Sebes to act almost as a sweeper. This was a particularly revolutionary idea, and one which had not become a mainstream tactical feature until the 21st century.
In defence, the role of the full-backs in providing support to the attack when in possession was perhaps one of the less complex aspects of the team’s functionality, although there is a hint from Sebes’ illustration that while Buzánszky’s primary role was to provide width, he was also encouraged to occasionally cut inside to cover the space left behind when Bozsik ventured forward, almost like an inverted full back. Lóránt occupied the role of sweeper, or libero, and his primary role was to cover the spaces left behind by whichever of the full-backs attacked, or by the forward movements of Bozsik. He wasn’t completely alone in covering these spaces – Zakariás also helped out in this regard.
In midfield, Zakariás provided the defensive cover, especially when Bozsik moved forward, and operated as a half-back almost in line with the full-backs. The role of Bozsik is a fascinating one. One could argue that he operated like a box-to-box midfielder, which is true, but with his base position being in the defensive midfield zone (plus his allocation of the 5 shirt), his role matches more closely that of a Segundo Volante. This would have maintained the element of surprise when Bozsik joined attacks – after all, how often did teams have to think about having to track the run of a player wearing the number 5 shirt back in the 1950s? In those days, when man-marking was prominent, it was all about keeping close tabs on shirts 7-11.
Talking about element of surprise, this leads us nicely to the role of Hidegkuti. It’s important to consider that Hidegkuti operated as an attacking midfielder getting forward from deep, as opposed to a false nine dropping back from an advanced position. The main reason Hidegkuti was able to draw out the opposite centre-back, especially against England, was by virtue of wearing the number 9 shirt rather than actually dropping back from an advanced position. This has caused much confusion among writers and researchers. If you want to think of a current version, consider Dele Alli, rather than, say, Roberto Firmino. Of his role and that of the team, Hidegkuti said:
“I usually took up my position around the middle of the field on Zakariás’ side, while Bozsik on the other flank often moved up as far as the opposition’s penalty area, and scored quite a number of goals, too. In the front line the most frequent goalscorers were Puskás and Kocsis … and they positioned themselves closer to the enemy goal than was usual with … the W-M system. After a brief experience with this new framework Gusztáv Sebes decided to ask the two wingers to drop back a little towards midfield, to pick up the passes to be had from Bozsik and myself, and this added the final touch to the tactical development.”
Jonathan Wilson, in Inverting the Pyramid, adds:
“He [Sebes] encouraged the two full-backs, Buzánszky and Mihály Lantos, to advance, but that meant the centre-half, Gyula Lóránt, dropping even deeper, into a position not dissimilar to the sweeper in Karl Rappan’s verrou system. Puskás had licence to roam, while Bozsik, notionally the right-half, was encouraged to push forwards to support Hidegkuti. That required a corresponding defensive presence, which was provided by the left-half, Zakariás, who, in the tactical plan for the game Sebes sketched in his notebook, appears so deep he is almost playing between the two full-backs. Two full-backs, two central defensive presences, two players running the middle and four up front: the Hungarian system was a hair’s-breadth from 4-2-4.”
In the tactical sketch from Sebes’ notebook, you will also notice three closely-aligned arrows pointing away from Czibor, and the same also from Puskás. My interpretation of this (feel free to disagree) is that these particular groups of arrows are Sebes’ code for ‘free to roam’. In Czibor’s case this would especially ring true for his role in Puskás’ outstanding drag-back goal at Wembley, when Czibor drifted from his usual left wing to the right byline to provide his low cut back to Puskás. Budai’s role was probably the most straightforward of the front four, mainly running down the right wing and supplying crosses for the other attackers. This was especially key in the Magical Magyars extra time semi-final victory over Uruguay in the 1954 World Cup, assisting twice for Kocsis. As for Kocsis and Puskás, they didn’t operate as traditional out-and-out strikers, nor did they function as inside-forwards, but rather as shadow strikers. The main difference between them was that Puskás was given more freedom to roam, and Kocsis, going by the sketch, was instructed to occasionally drift to the right – my assumption here is that this instruction was with the primary intention of pulling even more opposition defenders out of position for Hidegkuti, Puskás, Czibor, and the late-arriving Bozsik to exploit, and with a possible secondary intention of supporting Budai.
How to replicate the tactical setup in Football Manager?
A lot of time was taken to carefully research how the Magical Magyars functioned tactically. This included a variety of sources, such as Jonathan Wilson’s fascinating chapter ‘The Hungarian Connection’ in his book Inverting The Pyramid, the availability online of documentaries and footage of the England vs Hungary match at Wembley in 1953, and anecdotes of those who were part of that great team, namely Jenő Buzánszky and Nándor Hidegkuti, and those who witnessed their sheer brilliance on that fateful late-afternoon at Wembley, such as Sir Bobby Robson.
An even greater amount of time has been taken to find a way of getting the tactic right in FM20. Bearing in mind that much of Hungary’s play involved keeping possession, it has been commented by many seasoned players of the FM franchise that attaining high possession is a greater challenge in FM20 than in previous versions. I believe that I have found a reasonable – albeit far from perfect – solution to this challenge. At the same time, this had to be balanced with a commitment to replicating Sebes’ tactic in as true a form as could be achieved.
The graphic above shows the layout of the team, which FM20 identifies as a 3-2-2-3-0 DM formation. You will immediately think this sounds nothing like what Wilson called a near 4-2-4, but bear in mind that Zakariás was a half-back (which alters the pure defensive number from 4 to 3), the two wingers were encouraged to be positioned deeper to receive the ball – according to Hidegkuti himself – which adds an extra layer into the formation description in FM20 (the second 2), and Hidegkuti’s role – although visibly more advanced on the tactical screen – in the actual match engine sees him operate from a much deeper position true to his role. Initially, I was planning on using RB Salzburg as the team with which to test this tactic. However, with their team already being broken up in real-life by the sales of Minamino and Haaland to Liverpool and Borussia Dortmund respectively, I felt it would be more appropriate to use a club with a more settled squad, so I’ve chosen to use Liverpool. With this tactic, the roles (and typical choice of players) included:
- Alisson: Sweeper-Keeper (Support)
- Van Dijk: Libero (Support)
- Alexander-Arnold: Right Full-Back (Support)
- Robertson: Left Full-Back (Support)
- Fabinho: Half-Back (Defend)
- Keïta: Segundo Volante (Attack)
- Wijnaldum: Left Winger (Support)
- Chiesa: Right Winger (Support)
- Firmino: Attacking Midfielder (Attack)
- Mané: Right-sided Shadow Striker (Attack)
- Salah: Left-sided Shadow Striker (Attack)
A couple of things to point out here. I used Liverpool’s handy transfer budget to purchase Federico Chiesa from Fiorentina. Chiesa was chosen as he likes to hug the line, similar to how Budai operated in this role for Hungary. There are other candidates already within the squad who could operate in this role, such as Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain – even Trent Alexander-Arnold could be retrained in this role with Joe Gomez being utilised at right full-back – but Chiesa’s traits were truer to Budai’s way of playing.
Also, you may consider Xherdan Shaqiri a much more appropriate left winger. However, the left winger in this system is instructed to roam from position, as Czibor did here for Hungary, but despite this instruction Shaqiri very rarely ventured from his left wing, thus negatively affecting the fluidity of team attacks. I felt that the best way of encouraging the match engine to get this balance right was to use a right-footed player in this role, I’ve mentioned Wijnaldum in the above line-up, but I’ve rotated heavily with this particular role – Keïta, Milner, Wijnaldum, Lallana and Oxlade-Chamberlain have all performed in this role with the correctly intended balance that Czibor applied for the Magical Magyars.
The Segundo Volante role also gets rotated between players, Henderson is capable of doing a good job in either this role or as Half-Back, as is Wijnaldum, but Keïta’s willingness and ability to run with the ball (and without the ball) has seen him perform this role impressively in FM20.
Lastly, if you decide to try out this tactic with Liverpool, you may wish to consider Dejan Lovren’s future – there’s only one central-defensive role in this tactic – as van Dijk is naturally the first pick, and Gomez and Matip are the most able deputies considering the recovery pace, technical, and concentration levels required to perform the libero role with any degree of success.
Once these roles are in place, the only positional instructions you need to change are:
- Left Full-Back: Stay Wider (Bear in mind not to use this instruction for the Right Full-Back – Sebes’ notebook indicates that the Right Full-Back occasionally drifted inside, but not often enough for the role to be fully considered as an Inverted Full/Wing-Back. By simply leaving off the Stay Wider instruction for the Right Full-Back, the intended balance can be achieved).
- Half-Back: Take Fewer Risks.
- Segundo Volante: Move Into Channels.
- Right Winger: Pass It Shorter, Get Further Forward.
- Left Winger: Pass It Shorter, Get Further Forward, Roam From Position.
- Attacking Midfielder: Pass It Shorter, Roam From Position.
- Right-sided Shadow Striker: Stay Wider (This is optional: Sebes’ notebook indicates that Kocsis was encouraged to drift wide right occasionally. Stay Wider might be overdoing it – this is still being tested – but at the same time Roam From Position would not be suitable either as Kocsis didn’t have quite the same freedom to roam as Czibor, Puskás, and Hidegkuti).
- Left-sided Shadow Striker: Roam From Position.
I used the following settings for the tactical style:
- Mentality: Attacking.
- Attacking Width: Fairly Wide.
- Approach Play: Pass Into Space, Play Out Of Defence.
- Passing Directness: Slightly Shorter.
- Tempo: Extremely High.
- Time Wasting: Never.
- Final Third: Low Crosses, Work Ball Into Box (these are optional – these were most often the methods through which Hungary scored goals, but it is not the case that they never scored with shots from outside the box or from whipped crosses).
- Dribbling: Neutral.
- Creative Freedom: Be More Expressive.
- When Possession Has Been Lost: Counter-Press.
- When Possession Has Been Won: Counter.
- GK Distribution: Take Short Kicks.
- Defensive Shape: Use Offside Trap, Standard Line of Engagement, Much Higher Defensive Line (from extensive testing of the two lines, I’ve found – in FM20 specifically – that a standard line of engagement and much higher defensive line brings about a much improved performance in terms of retaining possession and quality of approach play).
- Defensive Width: Standard.
- Pressing Intensity: Extremely Urgent, Prevent Short GK Distribution.
Once I was finally happy with the tactical setup, the results were pleasing. Here were the results from the matches which followed that moment:
So far, that’s a resounding win over Chelsea in the European Super Cup, and a decent set of results in the Premier League. Plenty of goals have been scored – Salah scored hat-tricks in consecutive games against Man Utd and Everton (and Firmino has actually contributed with some assists!) – but a number of goals have been conceded too, which is hardly a surprise as Hungary conceded quite a few with this tactic also. Many chances will be conceded. It’s worth mentioning here that the match against Man Utd was one of the most entertaining games I’ve experienced in my many years of playing FM. Here is a brief overview of the first two of these matches:
Liverpool 4-0 Chelsea: An excellent performance from the team, with two goals in the opening 20 minutes and another two goals towards the end of the second half. Despite the clean sheet, Chelsea created a few good chances, but van Dijk performed well in the libero role (8.4) to keep them at bay. It was good goalscoring output from the front three, but the most pleasing aspect of this match was Firmino’s performance, getting a 9.1 rating with a goal and an assist. His assist is shown below: look at the run of Mané (who receives the through-ball and scores) but also the supporting runs of Chiesa and Salah. Wijnaldum is also in a great position to continue the attack in case the ball is cleared away to his side.
Watford 1-3 Liverpool: Another entertaining game. As you will see in the stats below, possession was fairly decent and both teams had many shots on target. Chiesa set up Mané’s second goal after a fantastic run and cross from the right wing (just seconds after the kick-off following Watford’s equaliser), and the Italian then scored a fine finish in the second half to complete a superb performance.
How you approach training with this tactic is entirely up to you. If you wish to truly immerse yourself into this experience by approaching training in a manner as close as possible to how Sebes implemented it with his Hungary team, then read further.
Most of the Hungary team of 1953 played their club football for Honvéd, a state-sponsored Army team. This involved fitness regimes and strong tactical familiarity. Sebes demanded rigorous training and standards of physical fitness, and wanted his players to be able to play in almost every position, so as to help them appreciate and understand all of their teammate’s style and strengths, and function in a fluid manner. In FM20, I would recommend use of the following in your training sessions:
- General: Attacking, Defending, Tactical, Physical (each of these are carried out as a team, not split into units).
- Match Preparation: Match Tactics and Teamwork.
- Physical: Endurance, Resistance, Quickness (even though General Physical has also been mentioned, these should also be included to emphasise the dedication to fitness as was required by Sebes).
- Technical: Chance Creation, Chance Conversion, Ball Distribution (these were fundamental in Hungary’s impressive attacking output).
- Tactical: Attacking Shadow Play (again, this was fundamental in their attacking output).
- Extra-Curricular: Team Bonding (as most of these players played club football for an Army team, there’s little doubt this would have been a key aspect of their regime – I often find that this is best used after a morale/energy-sapping physical session).
- Individual Training: If not already a natural, learning their new role to a more accomplished level. Otherwise, learning the role of one of their nearest teammates on the field.
I have created an example schedule, which is available in the download section at the end of this article.
Due to the physical demands of this style of play, Recovery sessions after each match hold even greater importance. Recovery sessions require a combination of Physios, Sports Scientists and a Doctor, so you need to ensure that the Physios and Sports Scientists are of a particularly high standard.
Suitable transfer targets for this system
If you are managing Liverpool, this is something to consider carefully. Various players in the team are at their peak age of performance, so it is worth considering bringing in young players who you can develop in the short term so that they are ready to step into their place once they have passed their peak. At Liverpool, there are already some youngsters with high potential who can be developed sufficiently in time to succeed their more senior teammates.
For example, in the short-term you could retrain Trent Alexander-Arnold as a right winger during which time Ki-Jana Hoever continues his development as a right full-back, Joe Gomez has the suitable age and attributes to succeed van Dijk long-term in the libero role (until then include Gomez on a rotational basis at right full-back or libero to keep him happy), other youngsters such Curtis Jones and Harvey Elliott can be developed for either the left winger or attacking midfielder roles, and Rhian Brewster will need to be retrained in the attacking midfield zone as a shadow striker. Upon return from his loan spell, Harry Wilson could become useful as a left winger, although I do have doubts that he would perform the role similarly to Czibor, or to right-footed alternatives. From outside of Liverpool, here are some players who, in theory, could perform well in this system:
Marcão: 23-year-old centre back at Galatasaray, valued at £7m. He has the ideal range of attributes to be able to perform as a libero, with his natural fitness invaluable for the role. His traits include bringing the ball out of defence (ideal), although he likes to try long range passes, which you may want to consider coaching out of him.
Ibrahim Sangaré: 21-year-old central midfielder at Toulouse, valued at £3.8m. Could offer excellent versatility towards this tactic. Decent in every aspect of his game, he has good potential for the Segundo Volante role. He also happens to have the ideal attributes for the libero role, if you wish to retrain him in this position.
Max Aarons: 19-year-old right full-back at Norwich, valued at £18.75m. Has a good blend of attributes, including acceleration and pace (both 16). What makes Aarons particularly useful are his set of traits: he gets forward whenever possible, plays short simple passes, and tries to play his way out of trouble – very much in tune with how this role was performed in Hungary’s system.
Hong Chul: Not the youngest, but the 28-year-old left-back from Suwon (valued at £625k) has a good set of attributes, and at his value he presents a viable, experienced, short-term solution. His 30 caps for South Korea should prevent any potential work permit difficulties. His concentration (16) is a standout attribute, and he’s also one who could be added to your list of set-piece takers.
Kristoffer Ajer: 21-year-old at Celtic, valued at £8.75m, who can operate in the central defensive, defensive midfield, and central midfield zones. The Norwegian’s versatility makes him a great option, but his attributes make him especially useful for the half-back role. He also offers strong aerial ability in defensive and attacking set-piece situations, but Ajer is also an intelligent player with very sound technique. He is arguably one of the best players in FM20 in terms of value for money.
Edmond Tapsoda: The 20-year-old central defender at Vit Guimaraes is valued at £3.2m, and has the relevant attributes to be retrained into a very capable half-back. A more budget-based option.
Emre Can: 25-year-old defensive midfielder/central midfielder at Juventus, valued at £38.5m. Throughout his career, especially at Liverpool and Juventus, finding the perfect role for the German international has always been (and remains) the toughest challenge. Segundo Volante could be that role. Venturing forward from very deep is his specialty – he has the work rate and fitness to do it, not to mention that he likes to run with the ball through the centre and play his way out of trouble. An expensive option, but this role could finally be a solution to the Can conundrum.
Sean Longstaff: 21-year-old defensive midfielder at Newcastle, valued at £13.75m. Has the suitable attributes for the Segundo Volante role, and benefits from having no real weaknesses.
Nicolás Acevedo: 20-year-old defensive midfielder at Liverpool de Montevideo, valued at £975k. If you are somehow able to get a work permit for this player, he could be a fine solution for the Segundo Volante role. He comes deep to get the ball (suitable for the role), although his tendency to try long range passes might need to be coached out of him. Has a good shot from range, too.
Federico Chiesa: 21-year-old right winger at Fiorentina. Purchased the Italian international while testing this tactic with Liverpool. He’s right-footed and likes to hug the line, which is exactly how Budai performed the right wing role for Hungary. Chiesa is armed with an outstanding set of attributes, including dribbling and off the ball. His crossing (13) may require some improvement, but that’s probably me being overly-critical.
Vittorio Parigini: 23-year-old attacking midfielder (left) based in Torino, valued at £2.3m. A much cheaper alternative to Chiesa. The right-footed Italian could be retrained as a right winger as he also likes to hug the like, required for the right wing role in this tactic. Has decent enough attributes to supply the front line.
Jadon Sancho: 19-year-old M/AM (RL) at Dortmund, valued at £32m. Buying Sancho would probably consume your entire transfer budget (if it’s big enough). However, he can play on the left, and being right-footed makes him among the best equipped to perform the role with any kind of similarity to Czibor. The blend of attributes are a promising indicator of this: agility (18), acceleration/dribbling/technique (17), flair/vision (16). A short-term loss on your budget will be rewarded by the long-term gains to be had with the left wing role sorted for the next decade.
Paulinho: 19-year-old M/AM (L) at Bayer Leverkusen, valued at £3.8m. Similar to Sancho (albeit not quite at the same level of talent), Paulinho could also offer the correct balance on the left wing between traditional wing play and roaming infield. Possesses great pace (17), balance (16) and natural fitness (16). A quality budget option.
Sergej Milinkovic-Savic: 24-year-old M/AM (C) at Lazio, valued at £55m. Hugely expensive, but the Serbian could perform the Hidegkuti role with incredible results when you consider his traits: gets into opposition area, moves into channels, gets forward whenever possible, and tries tricks. This is supported by great movement and excellent attributes for when the team does not have possession. Maybe we have found the next Hidegkuti.
Carlos Soler: 22-year-old M (RLC) at Valencia, valued at £21.5m. Soler would need to be retrained, but would be worthwhile as he possesses suitable attributes for the attacking midfielder (Hidegkuti) role. Good vision, passing and technique (all 15) is supported by plenty of 14s and 13s in other key areas.
Munir: 24-year-old AM (RLC)/ST at Sevilla, valued at £20m. Not the most clinical finisher, but Munir likes to work the channels and has good off the ball movement (15) and anticipation (16) to get into good positions as a shadow striker.
Odsonne Edouard: 21-year-old striker at Celtic, valued at £15.25m. Has some competency in the central attacking midfield zone, so will have a head-start with retraining for the shadow striker role. Excellent finishing ability (17), work rate (16), off the ball/composure/first touch (all 15) all add to Edouard’s goal threat.
Jude Bellingham: 16-year-old M/AMC at Birmingham, valued at £4.5m. One of the favourite wonderkids in FM20, Bellingham is already fairly competent in the central attacking midfield zone so he won’t require too much retraining, but it’s his movement, finishing ability, and suitable traits (gets into opposition area and gets forward whenever possible) that can make his transition into a shadow striker a seamless one.
A Football Manager tactic which looks to replicate Gusztáv Sebes Hungary tactical system used in the early 1950s. Experience an exciting attacking system which saw Hungary win Olympic gold in 1952, thrash England twice in 1953, and came very close to World Cup glory in 1954.
Download Training Schedule:
Hungary 1953 Typical Training Regime – Download