Pep Guardiola Man City Tactics 22/23 | NEW 3-2-4-1 Formation Recreated in Football Manager 2024

Channel your inner tactical genius by emulating Pep Guardiola’s tactical masterclass in Football Manager 2024. Experience the Pep Guardiola Man City tactics for 2022-2023 season in Football Manager 2024 with Pep’s new 3-2-4-1 formation in your tactics repository.

Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City​​ is currently on the road to win a remarkable Premier League hat-trick – a rare feat only their city rivals Manchester United have managed two times under sir Alex Ferguson, as well as being in position to win Manchester City’s second treble in the club’s history.

After four Premier League titles, four EFL Cups and an FA Cup trophy, Pep Guardiola has made Man city into a dominating force of English football.

The success Manchester City has had under Pep Guardiola can only be tributed to the tactical innovations Pep Guardiola has came up with since moving to England.

With positional play as the foundation for his possession-oriented Tiki-Taka tactical style, Pep Guardiola has used positioning, possession and pressing as tools to maintain control and dominate the opposition.

With Pep Guardiola’s tactical masterclass showcased in the Premier League 2022-23, it’s finally time for me to take a closer look at Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City tactics and how I have recreated Pep’s new 3-2-4-1 formation in Football Manager 2024.

But at first, let’s take a closer look at Pep Guardiola Man City Tactics for 2022/23 season by providing you with a tactical analysis of Pep Guardiola’s new 3-2-4-1 tactic!

In the last chapters we will look at how to recreate Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City tactics in Football Manager 2024 and how I have interpreted his latest innovation, the 3-2-4-1 formation in FM24. As always, you’ll be able to download the tactics and test them out in your own Football Manager save, by downloading the Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City tactics 22/23 at the end of this article.

Table of Content

• Tactical Analysis of Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City Tactics 22/23
  • The 3-2-4-1 Formation
  • The John Stones-role
  • The Box Midfield

Pep Guardiola: The Master of Reinvention

Pep Guardiola is the master of reinvention. At Barcelona, at Bayern Münich and now at Manchester City, he has revolutionized player roles that’s been used in the past and modernized it to today, catching both opposite managers and opposing players off guard by coming up with a new tactical innovation that helps his team to dominate the match in the way he sees fit.

Manchester City’s tactics under Pep Guardiola has become more and more flexible. From using mainly the 4-3-3 at Barcelona, the tactical system used at Manchester City changes swiftly from a back four to a back three in and out of possession, and from games to games. So far this season Pep Guardiola six different tactical formations and shapes from inverting the pyramid to the traditional 4-4-2.

The Manchester City tactics under Pep Guardiola can all be described as the football meta as the tactical genius of Pep Guardiola revives and innovates the game into a winning formula.

From 4-3-3 to 2-3-5, Pep Guardiola has changed football tactics in the 20th century in rapid steps by revolutionizing the way his teams play, season by season. Either to counter specific strengths of weaknesses of a single opponent, or to get the best out of his players, he has evolved by introducing something brand new to his tactics or revamped what’s been working before. For instance, by making small adaptions to how he uses his wingers and 8 and 10th’s to get the best out of the powerful striker, Erling Haaland, or how he uses his fullbacks and defensive midfielders.

His latest innovation, the new 3-2-4-1 tactics, that we hereby will look to recreate in Football Manager 2023, has seen Man City taking a huge step forward to claim both the UEFA Champions League and the Premier League trophy in the 2022/23 season.

Tactical Analysis of Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City Tactics 22/23

The 3-2-4-1 Formation

At the time of writing, Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City has used a 3-2-4-1 in the last 8 matches (approximately). The result is 23 goals and only 6 conceded with the system and trashing Liverpool and Southampton 4-1, as well as winning 3-0 against Bayern Münich in the first leg of UEFA CL quarterfinals. The first time he used it he managed to trash RB Leipzig 7-0!

The shift from a 4-1 shape at the back with a single pivot, to a double pivot in front of a back three – has not gone unnoticed! Especially, due to the tactical surprise of putting John Stones, a centre back, as one of two holding midfielders!

The move from 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1 that Pep Guardiola has traditionally used in the past seasons to a more unorthodox 3-2-5 formation in possession caught the attention of many pundits, including me!

In the early years of Pep Guardiola’s manager career, he used to convert defensive midfielders into centre backs to ensure he had players adept at passing the ball – helping the team to build out from the back.

Now the scenario is different.

With more focus on transitions and the speed of attacking transition, Pep Guardiola has taken his aggressive way of defending one step further by ensuring the team is able to defend against counter-attacks with the correct positioning of his players by moving one of the defenders higher up the pitch.

In today’s football, the speed of transition from defensive and attacking organization is more important than ever! With minimal requirement of time to change the shape in and out of possession, Pep Guardiola and other managers have tried to find the ideal solution to maintain numerical superiority in the middle of the pitch whilst also defending all zones and channels of the football pitch.

Manchester City’s new 3-2-4-1 tactic helps to do just that!

Rather than keeping two centre backs at the back to free up the wingbacks to move forward into the final third, only Rúben Dias holds position at the back with Aké and Akanji playing almost like traditional fullbacks.

The shape looks in many ways much similar to Ajax’s Total Football system and the Johan Cruyff’s 3-4-3 formation, at least the shape at the back. Especially, in terms of how Ajax used Ruud Krol and Suurbier as fullbacks, and one player (Vasovic or Hulshoff) pushing up in the midfield, just like a libero – something that is somehow similar to the Stones role within Pep Guardiola’s new Manchester City 3-2-4-1 tactics!

In practice, the team defends with four defenders, but when the team is in possession, Ruben Dias is one on one with the opposing forward. As Ruben Dias remains central to protect that area of the pitch, Rodri hold his position in front of the wide back three, with Stones close connected to him.

To the left of Rodri, Ilkay Gündogan kept himself to the left half space with Kevin de Bruyne out wide in the right half space, while Haaland was up front as a pressing forward who dropped deep in the build-up.

In reality, Manchester City’s 3-2-4-1 system looked like this:

The position of these three midfielders is much similar to how the team would operate in a 4-3-3 formation with one runner, one playmaker and one holding midfielder.

The only difference in this instance was the role of John Stones.

The Stones Role

The role of John Stones is quite interesting and rather new within this remarkable 3-2-5 formation. As mentioned earlier, it has its similarities to how the libero was used within Ajax’s Total Football in the 70s.

When the team is in possession of the ball, John Stones and Rodri operated in the middle of the pitch by staying closely together. In this structure, Rodri remained largely in the centre of the park but could also move into the left half space, meanwhile John Stones were responsible for holding position in the right half space.

The position of the double pivot saw the two defensive midfielders of Manchester City meant the team could create a defensive block that’s hard to penetrate through the middle as well as creating numerical superiority in the center of the park.

When the team was in possession, either Rodri or Stones would advance forward by holding position just outside the penalty box while the other covered the space in front of the centre backs.

Most often, it was Rodri who had the licence to do his defensive covering duty higher up the pitch, something we saw at times in the Bayern Münich home affair when he close down players high up the pitch when the team had just lost possession. Other times, he covered the space behind the two number eights meanwhile Stones acted like a false centre back.

This is how Rodri scored his screamer in the first leg of UEFA Champions League quarter finals against Bayern Münich.

The rotation of the two defensive midfielders made the team very fluid and gave another dimension to the team both in and out of possession.

However, when the opposition had possession of the ball, and the team needed to transition into the defensive phase, John Stones moved back into defence to form a traditional four at the back defence.

This is something we saw over and over again against Bayern Münich, with the team defending in a traditional 4-1-4-1 or 4-4-2 and attacking in a 3-2-5.

What John Stones brings to the team in possession?

The role of John Stones when the team is in possession of the ball is something we need to look at as well.

The role of Stones in possession was crucial to creating the ideal passing lanes and triangles.

When Dias had the ball, John Stones provided an additional (fourth) passing option, and a way for Man City to build out from the back with less risk. If Bayern Münich wanted possession, they would have to move players forward, otherwise it would be 5 vs 4 in the build up.

When building up play through the middle third, John Stones, as said earlier, dropped between the lines of the opposing team’s attacking midfield and defensive midfield line. From here, he could link up play with Akanji or Rodri by providing an extra passing option to advance play forward.

The positioning of Stones saw him connect with Kevin de Bruyne in a manner that enabled him to make a short but accurate pass towards forward. If he was closed down, he could play the ball back to Akanji, who moved slightly forward and was able to receive the ball beyond the opposition winger as he went towards Stones to close him down.

If under pressure, Stones could also make counter-attacking passes towards the opposing wing – creating those turnovers that helps to destabilize the oppositions defensive block.

Despite a pass completion ratio of 93% and averaging 75.8 touches per game the number of long ball passes per game, the number of counter-attacking passes and switches of play from Stones was far fewer than Rodri (5.3 long balls per game) who has made 2.9 long balls per game so far.

Regardless, it describes how important Stones were both as an opportunity to retain possession and maintain control in the build-up, as well as switching play and advance ball quickly into the final third – to players with the skills of opening up the oppositions defensive block – like Kevin de Bruyne or Bernardo Silva.

From Inverted Wingbacks to ‘Libero’

Asking one of the centre back’s to push forward and not using any wingbacks who overlaps on the flanks is ‘completely new’ to Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City tactics, at least from my perspective.

The movement of a player, in this instance John Stones a centre back, from defence into midfield in the transition from defensive to attacking phase isn’t uncommon at all. For the last two seasons, Pep Guardiola and scholars of the positional play, has used to let one of the fullbacks invert into a second holding midfielder when the team is building up play. Fernandinho has also played as a false centre-back, just like Stones.

The tactical trend of using an inverted wing-back, or two, in their system has been seen at;

• Mikel Arteta’s Arsenal with Oleksandr Zinchenko and Ben White in that role
• Xavi’s Barcelona of 2021-22 season as Daniel Alves acted like an inverted wingback
• Erik ten Hag’s Ajax used either Danny Blind or Nasraoui Mazraoui on one of the flanks

How Pep Guardiola used Joao Cancelo and Kyle Walker often led the team using a 2-3-5 shape in possession. And, in 2021 he would even look to use a 3-1-3-3 shape with Cancelo inverting into a third midfielder and pushing further forward than in his role in the 2-3-5 system where he moved in the left half space next to Rodri.

The 3-1-3-3 shape has many similarities to Johan Cruyff’s 3-4-3 formation with Rodri holding position in front of the back three and de Bruyne playing behind the front three.

So why doesn’t Pep Guardiola keeps using a 4-3-3 with an inverted wingback on one of the flanks? Or two, for that matter to keep using his 2-3-2-3 shape anymore?

If he wanted a 3-2-5 shape in possession and a double pivot, he could be asking his right back to invert, as in the past.

However, the answer could probably be due to how vulnerable a position switch between two players leaves the team in defensive transition, especially when players moves from one channel to the next.

One of the weaknesses when a player moves out of their designated defensive positioning is the vulnerable space it leaves. For instance, if Oleksandr Zinchenko inverts into midfield from his left back position, it creates a space down the left flank for the opponents to counter in, if the team isn’t able to slow down the speed of transition, for instance by closing down the ball carrier with counter-pressing, or block passing options.

The same applies for Man City’s right flank.

If John Stones, or any other player should invert back and forth from wide channel to right half space, the player has to travel for a longer distance, leaving the space on the right more vulnerable, meaning the right centre back has to cover for his movement.

At the same time, when players switch positions and zones, the responsibilities of marking, or having control of a particular player in and out of possession must be efficiently passed on. It requires more of the players, their ability to keep tabs of the ball, the opposing opponent and areas to defend.

This moment of chaos in the defensive organization can effectively be taken advantage of by attacking players of the opposition team with opposite movements that makes one of the players in doubt of who has control of whom, and where he needs to go.

It means that the player who inverts must recover quickly into his defensive positioning as the time spent getting the players to move in and out from that 3-2-5 attacking shape to the defensive 4-4-2 shape is crucial. Any small hesitations or doubts regarding which player to track, and the area on right back position is open to be attacked in.

Instead, the movement of Stones from centre back to midfield, requires less of the players awareness when the play is transitioning from attack to defence. He can simply take a few steps back in the same channel he’s in rather than move wide at the same time as Akanji moves from the half space channel towards the center.

The benefit?!

A more structured and organized shape that gives the players more control of which zones they are responsible for and less distance to move back in a defensive block.

The Box Midfield

The innovation from Pep Guardiola to ask one of the centre backs to push out of the defensive line in possession gives a new dimension to the Manchester City tactics by creating a box midfield.

The position of the Stones and Rodri in the double pivot created a box midfield with Ilkay Gündogan and Kevin de Bruyne. However, the box midfield was much more asymmetric than my illustrations.

In some matches, the average positioning of the midfielders could easily look like the midfielders where split into two halves of triangles, where Gündogan on the left half space created a triangle with Grealish and Aké, meanwhile Kevin de Bruyne was closely linked to Silva and Haaland.

Something that made the average position of Man City seem like an asymmetric 4-3-3 formation with three players moved higher up on the right flank, than the left. At least, against Bayern Münich.

Anyway, average position aside, the positioning of two holding midfielders in front of two number eights gave us a 3-2-2-3 / 3-2-5 formation in possession.

As talked about in the evolution of Tiki-Taka, the box midfield was first present in the W-M formation utilized by Herbert Chapman at Arsenal in the 1930s.

Now, the 3-2-2-3 shape is back in a more modern variant.

With two holding midfielders in front of a back three, it enables the team to defend against counter-attacks by protecting the channels perfectly, and essentially maintain control both in and out of possession.

The Advantages of a Box Midfield

The movement of Stones into midfield (when the team is in possession) gives the team a number of advantages outside simply covering for breaks.

1. More Triangles & Passing Options

On the one hand it helps to create as many passing options for the player with the ball.

Similar to the 2-3-2-3 shape that I prefer within my Tiki-Taka tactic, the 3-2-2-3 formation provides multiple triangles and diamonds. As always in a possession-oriented system, it’s a matter of ensuring each player has at least two passing options on the ball.

One of the central attacking midfielders will become an extra man depending on whom the opposing defensive midfielder marks. A similar situation happens if the opposition plays with a 4-2-3-1 system. Then, one of the two defensive midfielders will be free of man-marking. And, even if the opposition tries to man-mark the two double pivots, one of the two wide centre-backs will become an extra man.

Against a 4-3-3 formation, the box midfield creates a numerical superiority in the middle – forcing one of the wingers to tuck inside to man mark or press John Stones with the ball. As the winger moves inside to cover the passing lane towards Stones, it opens up a passing lane from Akanji towards Bernardo Silva or Kevin de Bruyne on the right flank.

This use of a box midfield where wingers stay high and wide creates more space in the middle. In fact, it opens up passing lanes and more opportunities to advance play.

What’s always apparent in Manchester City’s play under Pep Guardiola is the focus on creating as many attacking triangles as possible.

At the same time, the two central midfielders in a 2-3-5 / 3-2-5 shape enables the team to progress play via either Rodri, Stones, or an inverted wingback (for those past systems).

Regardless of whom is in the central, they are able to receive the ball in between the lines and create 3vs1 scenarios that helps to maintain control in possession.

Earlier we’ve talked about the numerical superiority at the back, but it’s not only in the build-up Manchester City had numerical superiority. With a front five, that comes from the movement of the two number eights between the channels, it looked to outnumber opposition’s back four.

In these scenarios the passing triangle enabled the team to break through the opposition lines as movements and quick short passes created gaps in the opposition’s defensive structure if they pushed out to close down the ball carrier.

These passing triangles of the box midfielder was aided by the wingers instructions to pin the opposition fullback and ensure there were space in the middle to progress play.

2. Overloads by movements

On the other, it gives the freedom for the two central midfielders to push forward to support the three forwards in the final third with frequent runs from deep. Third man runs is something we’ve seen often from Manchester City with Ilkay Gündogan making smart movements behind the opposing defensive line, or Kevin de Bruyne making runs both with and without the ball behind Haaland, who drops deep like a deep-lying forward or false 9.

However, how the two central midfielders supported the front three was slightly different from match to match and on an event basis. Sometimes, Ilkay Gündogan could stay rather deep, almost like an advanced playmaker who looked to created triangles with Grealish and Rodri, meanwhile Kevin de Bruyne looked to overload on the right flank by staying close to Haaland and Bernardo Silva.

Other times, Kevin de Bruyne would roam between the lines and give Gündogan the licence to make penetrating third man runs from deep. If de Bruyne received the ball he would have multiple options.

He could look to play a through ball to Haaland, retain possession by setting up Bernardo Silva for a one-two, or make one of his well known crosses from outside the corner of the 16 yard area towards the opposite flank.

In reality, the change from how Pep Guardiola used inside forwards at Barcelona to how the wingers and fullbacks operated in Pep Guardiola’s new 3-2-4-1 Manchester City tactics, meant that most of the runs from deep had to come from the central attacking midfielders.

The necessity of these third man runs in Pep Guardiola’s variant of utilizing positional play at Manchester City is perfectly elaborated by current Barcelona manager, Xavi:

“The third man is impossible to defend, impossible… Imagine Pique wanting to play with me, but I’m marked, I have a defender on me, a very aggressive guy. Well, it is clear that Pique can not pass to me. If I move away, I’ll take the marker with me. Then, Messi goes down and becomes the second man.

Pique is the 1st, Messi the 2nd and I the 3rd, I have to be very alert, right?! Pique then plays with the 2nd man Messi, who returns it, and at that moment I’m an option. I’m now free of my marker who has moves to defend closer to the ball. Now I’m totally unmarked and if Pique passes to me we have achieved superiority.

This is indefensible, it’s the Dutch school, it’s Cruyff. It’s an evolution of the Dutch triangles. […] To look for the third man is, for example, that the central players have the ball and one if them is always open because you always have one player more than opposing strikers. We seek superiority in any area of the field. You make a three against two, you win and you have the third man. We advance positions up the field”.Xavi Hernandez, Spielverlagerung.com 22.03.2022

3. Better Attacking Structure = Better Defensive Structure

With the movement of the two number eights pushed up on either side of the forward, it creates a front five that covers the width of the pitch perfectly. The attacking structure pins back the opposition team to that regard one of the wingers must drop deep in a settled block to protect against 2vs1 scenarios on the side play is in, especially if facing a back four.

The attacking structure of five forwards versus four defenders results in a free man on the pitch which helps to retain possession or advance play into the final third. It forces the opposition team to behave more compact, opening up the space for the wingers who got the highest qualities in one-on-one situations.

But the real benefit of the attacking structure is the increased probability of regaining possession if it’s lost. With so many players around the ball zone, the attacking structure of 2+3 can let the team counter-press more effectively if the ball is lost high up the pitch.

The attacking players can make more effort trying to close down and regain possession high up the field as soon as the ball is lost, knowing that they have great defensive cover behind them with two defensive midfielders protecting the center and two narrow fullbacks protecting the half space channels.

One of the biggest advantages with a system using three narrow defenders (one centre back and two narrow fullbacks) coupled with a double pivot in front is not only the flexibility the team has to get an extra man in defence and midfield when in or out of possession but also the ability to defend the box more comfortably by congesting the area in front of the penalty box (opponent’s zone 14) with a box midfield, as the team defends in a 4-4-2 shape with Rodri and Gündogan holding the line and wingers tucking inside.

How Manchester City looks to Build-Up play?

Like any possession-oriented teams, Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City favors to play out from the back with a patient build-up by working the ball in intricate passing patterns. However, how they build up play from the back depends on the opposition’s line of engagement and pressing intensity. Lately, they have used anything from 3+2 to 4+2 when building out from the back.

When Ederson, a goalkeeper with great distribution skills got the ball, Dias looks to position himself inside the penalty box for a short option. In these situations, Ake will move wide while Akanji will offer a passing options on the edge of the penalty area on the right flank.

The third passing option for Ederson to play out from the back with a short pass comes from Rodri dropping deep between the fullbacks – creating a diamond shape with Dias, Akanji and Ake.

This will normally create a 4vs3 when playing out from the back.

Once the ball goes to one of the fullbacks, the movement of Stones into midfield opens up space to progress the ball down the wings. As he moves towards the center of the pitch, it may attract the attention of the winger. If he follows Stones, a passing lane is open to progress the ball forward along the flanks, or onto Akanji who stays wide of Dias and beyond the opposing winger.

What often happens when Ake or Akanji receives the ball is the immediate initiative to make progressive passes towards either Grealish on left wing or Silva/Mahrez on the right wing. Against Bayern Münich it was actually Kevin de Bruyne who received the most progressive passes, whilst against Liverpool, it was Mahrez who received the most progressive passes – both playing on the right wing at the time.

The fullbacks also got the option to retain possession by playing it onto Rodri who remains central – as the main hub of the passing wheel. So far this season, Rodri has made 87,4 passes per game at a 91.3% pass completion ratio according to Whoscored. He also makes the most of his passes in the middle third of the pitch, something that tells us how Man city uses him in the build-up between playing out from the back and until the ball reaches the final third.

How Manchester City builds up depends on the opposition’s press and how many players they use in the first line of defence.

With a player like Erling Haaland’s abilities to hold up the ball and play with the back against the goal, more opportunities for Ederson and the defenders opens up when facing a high press.

Against the high press, Manchester City has a number of alternatives to progress the ball.

One opportunity is to ask the wide center-backs to drop deeper with Stones and Rodri coming deep to receive the ball as well. The player’s doesn’t have to travel far before a 3-1 shape becomes a 4-2 shape when playing out from the back.

Secondly, is Ederson’s abilities to kick the ball long. His long kicks can be used now or then as a counter-attacking move. When he does, he often looks to kick the ball over the opposition’s high press and over the top of the midfield towards Erling Haaland who is highly press-resistant and great in one-on-one situations, either by holding up the ball by using his body strength or first touch to get control of the ball before passing it off or turning with it.

Regardless of the opportunity to distribute the ball long to left flank, Manchester City under Pep Guardiola favors to distribute the ball short to either the centre backs or the fullbacks – giving us the patience build-up that tries to draw the opposition forward and create spaces between the lines to advance the ball forward with quick short passes.

What we often see is that Manchester City prefers to focus play down one of the flanks. Most often, Pep Guardiola instructs his players to look towards Jack Grealish when building out from the back, and to enable the team to enter the final third..

The positioning of the wide center backs enables the team to progress the ball down the flank as their positioning by staying wide opens up clear passing lanes in the wide channels, for instance to one of the inverted wingers.

In the next page, I will look closer at how Manchester City enters the final third and how they attack space by movements.